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MARRIAGE AND THE ETHICS OF OFFICE
Scorr

FITZGIBBON*

This Article aims to retrieve the neglected concept of the
"office," as in "the judicial office" or "corporate officer" or the
"office of deacon or lector." It aims to present a thorough
account of what that term means. It inquires into the ethics of
office, advancing the thesis that to hold and exercise office is a
good thing, not only in the obvious instrumental ways-it serves
a function and it gets results-but also as a part of the "final,"
noninstrumental good of the officeholder and even, in some
arrangements, of the recipient of the officeholder's services.
Office is an aspect of human flourishing.
Further, this Article aims to establish that marriage is an
office. It proposes that marriage is good in the ways that office is
good and that marriage suffers when a society neglects its officelike features.
Office involves duty. That seems to be clear from common
usage and general belief. Someone who holds no relevant office
may or may not help you when you are sick, but if you are a
patient in a hospital your attending physician must do so. Someone who holds no relevant office may or may not help you vindicate your legal rights when they have been violated, but the
policeman or the district attorney or the judge must assist. Your
boyfriend, your girlfriend, or a casual acquaintance may or may
not stick by you in good times and bad, but your spouse must be
faithful. That is because physicians, policemen, district attorneys,
judges, and (it is here argued) husbands and wives are holders of
offices and have special obligations. So to explore the nature of
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office a good way to start is with the nature of obligation. To
develop an account of the goods involved in office, it will help to
explore the question of how obligation can be good.
PART ONE: THE NATURE AND GOOD OF OBLIGATION
"How blessed is anyone who delights in the commandments! ... [H]is uprightness stands firm forever."'

I.

THE NATURE OF OBLIGATION

Obligation has been defined as "being tied, required, or
constrained to do (or from doing) something by virtue of a
moral rule, a duty, or some other binding demand."2 The derivation of "obligation" is "obligatio,"a binding up. So to be under an
obligation is to be tied.
As this suggests, propositions about obligation have a special
character, different from many propositions about ethics. They
do not describe a good; rather they direct a person to act or
refrain from acting. "Feeding the hungry is good" does not quite
express obligation; "you must feed the baby" may express one.
And they go beyond recommending, they insist. The following
explores these features more thoroughly.
A.

Obligation Involves Ethical Traction: The Three Sectors of Ethics
and Where ObligationFits In
Normative statements usually have something to tell us
about these elements: ends, actions, actors, and how to think
about actions. It helps to distinguish among three sectors.
1. Psalms 112:1-3 (The NewJerusalem Bible).
2. OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 632 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995);
see also GERMAIN GRISEZ, CHRISTIAN MORAL PRINCIPLES 255 (1983) ("Not all morally good acts are obligatory-for example, feeding the hungry is good yet not
obligatory. The reason is that an act of this kind can have an alternative itself
morally good.").
The linguistic philosophers had a debate during the 1950s and 1960s about
whether there is a difference between "duty" and "obligation." See R.B. Brandt,
The Concepts of Obligation and Duty, 73 MIND: NEW SERIES 374 (1964) (arguing
that obligation is paradigmatically about contract and promise whereas duty is
paradigmatically about the requirements of office). The present Article uses
"obligation" and "duty" interchangeably.
Both "obligation" and "duty" are sometimes made to refer to the action or
even the outcome rather than to the bond. This is the way the term "duty" is
used in the statement "I did my duty." Another example defines obligation as
"[a] n action that is required of one." SIMON BLAcKBuRN,THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 267 (1994). In this Article "obligation" is understood to
refer to the bond rather than to the action which we are bound to take.
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First, actions and the ends of actions usually take center
stage. The phrase "those with income must pay taxes" supports
or commends paying taxes. The phrase "the wealthy should give
to the poor" supports giving to the poor. Likewise, the phrase
"you must not slander" derogates slander. The area which concerns actions and their ends can be called the "first sector" of
ethics.
A second set of components-who should pursue the ends,
who should take the actions, with what degree of commitment,
subject how readily to any excuses-often receives less attention.
Some normative statements do not even allude to them explicitly. Examples of such statements include "beauty is good," and
"burping is rude." But most normative statements do refer to
them, deploying persons in service of appropriate ends and mandating or recommending modes of deployment. "Those with
income must pay taxes" deploys by the phrase "those with
income must." "The wealthy should give to the poor" deploys by
the phrase "the wealthy should." These matters-they might be
called "proximate ethics" because they concern the interface
between first-sector matters and the actor-are the most directly
relevant to obligation and office. The area into which they fall is
here referred to as the "second sector" of ethics.
The third area concerns the deliberations of the ethical
actor and, more generally, all his intellectual and affective
responses to first-sector and second-sector matters. Important
components here include perceiving and apprehending the
good, considering and assessing rules and principles, and structuring plans and attitudes in ways which respond to them. (Or,
perhaps, rejecting them.) This area is here called the "third
sector."
Obligations fall into the second sector. A world without
good or right could have people but no obligation; a world without people could have good (beautiful trees) but no obligation:
you need both for obligation because obligation involves the
intersection. A statement about obligation tells how a norm or
an aspect of the good impinges upon some person; how it applies.
It tells about what might be called "traction." It falls into a cluster of terms in which other examples might be "vocation" or
"calling" (as in "a calling to be a teacher"). Statements about
obligation involve assertions about how a norm or an aspect of
the good bears upon the life of the obligated person.
Academic ethics mostly concerns the first sector. But "on
ground level" ethics is more about the second sector and how it
relates to the third. People in trouble, pondering the forks on
life's road ask, "Where do my commitments lie? How am I
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bound to act? What am I called to do?" Saint Augustine, in the
period leading up to his crisis, already understood a great deal
about the good. His difficulties concerned its bearing upon himself. He knew that chastity was a virtue, but his problem lay in
taking it on as an obligation. Ultimately, "I submitted my neck to
your easy yoke," he wrote, "and my shoulders to your light burden."3 Similarly, people looking back with regret, repenting,
often reflect not only on the badness of the acts they performed
and the bad consequences which ensued, but also on the error of
misapprehended attachments and inappropriate commitments.
B.

Obligation Is a Demanding Variety of Ethical Traction

Within the second sector, obligations lie at the strong end of
a continuum. Suggestions, recommendations, and other weak
bonds lie at the other extreme. Obligations are demanding. To
be obliged is to be firmly bound, as with a rope. In marriage,
sexual fidelity is obligatory, entertaining conversation and a good
income are merely desiderata. In the political community, to
avoid supporting the enemy in wartime is obligatory; to pay taxes
is obligatory; to become well-informed and send intelligent let4
ters to the editor on political issues are extras.
C.

Obligation Is Bipolar: Both Ends Point the Rope

As a rope tying a person to an action and its good, obligation
has a bipolar quality. Your obligation to feed a child may be
affected by his situation (the obligation may disappear if he
ceases to be underfed); and the obligation may also be affected
by your circumstances and activities (it may diminish if your parents fall into need; it may augment if you adopt the child). Overlooking this bipolarity distorts thinking about the good of
obligation, as will emerge.
3. SAINT AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 155 (Henry Chadwick trans., Oxford
Univ. Press 1991) (quoting Matthew 11:30).
4. The distinction is not between precepts which leave choices and those
which do not. Feeding your children is an obligation even though you can
choose which foods. Rather, the distinction is between norms which lie within
a strict core of ethical requirements and those which fall outside, in a supererogatory penumbra. See generally DAVID HEYD, SUPEREROGATION: ITS STATUS IN
ETHICAL THEORY (1982); see also GREGORY MELLEMA, BEYOND THE CALL OF DUTY:
SUPEREROGATION, OBLIGATION AND OFFENCE (1991); cf THE OXFORD DICTIONARY
OF JEWISH RELIGION 211 (R.J. Zwi Werblowsky & Geoffrey Wigoder eds., 1997)
("Duty (Heb. hovah), an obligation or due ....
Hovah is distinct from mitsvah,
which can also signify a commendable, but not necessarily obligatory, action
. .. .
.).
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II.

WHAT IS

THE

A.

GOOD

oF OBLIGATION?

The Question

It helps to start by noticing two things this question is not
inquiring into. First, it is not a question about pedigree or the
power to initiate obligation: it does not ask whether obligation is
valid without consent, or whether the state possesses the power
or capacity to create it. Second, it is not a question about basic
skepticism: it does not ask whether there are any obligations or
whether there is such a thing as the good or the true or the
knowable.
Rather, it will help to stick with the common apprehension
that we do live in a world which is rich in real obligations, arising
from various sources and really binding really obliged individuals, and in that frame of mind to follow out the analysis of this
article, which is designed to answer the question "what is the
good of them?" Why accept any or bind yourself to any by contract? Why, if you have the authority to do so, impose any obligation on others? What makes an obligation good? What might
justify the world as we see it-thick with obligation?
B.

Why It Is a Hard Question

Distinguishing the good involved in obligation (or any ethical traction) is difficult because one's view can easily be
obstructed by the much more vivid goods involved in the first
sector of ethics. The obligation not to lie at first seems to be all
about the bad of lying, for example, or the good of fostering true
belief. And indeed this appearance does reflect some of the reality of the situation since the good of an obligation has something5
to do with the good of what it accomplishes when it is fulfilled.
But much of the remainder of this Part One is devoted to showing that this is not the whole story.
Distinguishing the good involved in obligation may also be
difficult because of the need to disentangle matters in the third
sector of ethics. It may seem that the good of obligation really
boils down to the good of one's inward response to obligationthe good of "commitment," for example. It may also seem that
the good of acting according to obligation is an extension of this
inner state-a part of "authenticity," for example. Again, there
are some realia behind these appearances, since obligation does
not participate much in the good when it is ignored entirely. But
this Article is devoted to demonstrating that this is not the whole
story.
5.

See infra Part I.H.
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The Sanctions-Based Account of Obligation

One prominent account of obligation defines it based on
threat of harm:
A party lying under a duty is liable to evil or inconvenience
(to be inflicted by sovereign authority) if he disobeys the
Command. This conditional evil is the Sanction which
enforces the duty; and the party bound or obliged, is
bound or obliged, because he is liable to this evil, if he disobeys the command. That bond, vinculum, or ligamen,
which is of the essence of duty, is, simply or merely, liability
to a Sanction.6

The major thrust of this kind of theory has to do with the
positivist project of developing accounts of law, obligation, duty,
rights, and so on which separate them out from and create of
them a system which works independently from ethics. This is a
difficult project, and may not be achievable. Even if it is, it would
result in a system of norms would hardly seem to matter; a system
populated by "obligations" which it would be wrong to discharge
and "legal systems" which it would be wrong to comply with. 7 In
any event, the project is of little interest here because this article
is about ethics. It aims to determine the good of obligation, not
whether that term could be given a coherent meaning independent of the good.
Another thrust of this kind of theory is more destructive,
and aims to present an account of obligation which aims not only
to separate out from but to supplant relevant ethics altogether.
A sanctions-based theory proposing itself in this way violates common sense. Your baby is hungry and cold and no one can know
that but you. You have no obligation to care for her. I threaten
to lash you with a wet noodle if you feed or clothe her. You have
an obligation not to care for her. Those are the preposterous
implications.

6.

JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSI-

TIVE LAw 199 (Robert Campbell ed., 1913); accordJOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE
OFJURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE USES OF THE DuTY OFJURISPRUDENCE 14

(Isaiah Berlin et al. eds., Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1954) (1832) ("Being liable to
evil from you if I comply not with a wish which you signify, I am bound or obliged
by your command, or I lie under a duty to obey it.") (emphasis in original).
7. See J. Raz, Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties, 4 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL
STUD. 123, 131 (1984) (stating that if the sanctions-based account of duty is
correct then "either it is not wrong to fail to fulfil [sic] one's duty or ... acting
wrongly is not something one has a reason not to do.").

2004]

MARRIAGE AND THE ETHICS OF OFFICE

D.

ContractualAccounts

Another leading approach attempts to reduce obligation to
consent, promise, and contract. There is more than a grain of
wisdom in this, since obligations are often instituted by some sort
of acceptance. Marriage, for example, usually commences with
of vows, and some theorists identify maran impressive exchange
8
contract.
a
as
riage
It seems, however, that a contractual account cannot supply
the whole story. First, such an approach would entirely exclude
obligations of other sorts: noncontractual, nonpromissory,
unchosen obligations. Children, we apprehend, have obligations
to parents, citizens to country, and man to God. Parties who
have not yet entered into a contract but are preparing to do so
have duties, we apprehend, to negotiate in good faith and not to
lie to one another. Parties not even preparing to enter into a
contractual relationship have obligations, it seems, to return lost
property or at least not to destroy it and to remit funds paid by
mistake. Even complete strangers have duties to one another,
for example, to drive carefully and to pay damages when their
carelessness causes accidents. These are the conclusions of Aris-

totle, the Roman jurists, the Justinian compilers, as well as many
other thinkers.'
A second point extends the first by applying it to close relationships. Many affiliations which are not contractual in the
commercial meaning of that term are widely regarded as rich
fields of obligation: guardianships, trusts, and marriage, for
example. Many of these obligations go unmentioned in any formal avowal. Husbands and wives have obligations not mentioned
in the wedding vows. The groom does not swear to live with his
spouse or to support her materially or to help with the babies."
Even where there are comprehensive promises, the obligations
8.

See, e.g., GARY S.

BECKER,

A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 43 (1991)

("'[M]arriage' [is] the term for a written, oral, or customary long-term contract
between a man and a woman to produce children, food, and other commodities in a common household."); see also JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO
CONTRACT:

MARRIAGE,

RELIGION

AND

LAW

IN THE

WESTERN

TRADITION

194

(1997) (describing the rise of the contractual understanding) [hereinafter
WIrrE, SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT].

9. See generally Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 189, 201 (1997) ("[T]he existence of a relationship that one has
reason to value is itself the source of special responsibilities, and those responsibilities arise whether or not the participants actually value [or have agreed to]
the relationship.").
10. And many affiliations which people regard as freighted with obligation are initiated without a contract in the central, exchange-of-specificpromises sense of the term "contract."
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seem to have some deeper, subpromissory basis. No one would
think he had an excuse for adultery if he could reread his wedding vows in some future year and discover that they had omitted
the part about "forsaking all others.""
A third point notes that even the classic contract of the
negotiated, exchange-of-promises type does not seem to stand
exclusively on a morality of promise. We apprehend, and our
legal system demands, that a contract be interpreted based in
part on public policy and requirements of conscionability.
A final point is that all the contractarian account achieves is
to attach all other obligations to one particular kind of obligation. We are left asking what the good of that is: asking why contract, promise, and consent obligate.
At present, the leading theory about the good of contract is
one based on utilitarianism-on economic thought-the nub of
which is that contracts ought to be respected and enforced
because they maximize utility. It is a consequentialist theory, and
this article gives careful attention to the merits and limitations of
consequentialist approaches in the next subsection.
E.

Accounts Based on Consequentialistand DeontologicalEthics

Suppose there were no obligation. Suppose, if you can, that
people were to obligation as jellyfish are to rope. Suppose, in
other words, that somehow no norm ever applied with special
force to one person more than to another and that no norm,
however firm a basis it might have for its first-sector components,
ever took hold of anyone in more than a mild, suggestive way.
This supposition may be difficult to wrap your mind around.
Thought experiments can be hard enough to perform when they
posit a factualworld vastly different from the real one, but here is
a thought experiment which posits a divergent normative world.
You might first imagine, by way of comparison, a world which is
different in respect to its positive norms. All the statutes are
framed as general suggestions. One statute would read, "It is suggested that people not murder." Another might say, "Legislative
bodies are advised to make no law respecting an establishment of
religion." Now, with the assistance of this analogy, try imagining
a world in which nonpositive ethics is like that as well. In this
11. As a thought experiment, imagine a couple whose wedding was the
illusionary trick of some Genie. If this couple lives and thinks as though man
and wife for many years, only now to discover the illusory nature of their vows,
have they significant ties to one another? You may deny that they are fully married, but if you conclude that they have some such ties then you believe that
express contract and promise is not the entire story.
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world, you might say, "It is better to avoid adultery and commendable for you (and anyone else) to feed your children when
they are hungry," or, "It is admirable when a physician completes
the surgery." You might also say, "Promises and even the most
solemn oaths are not to be taken too seriously." You have
imagined a permissive world, a world of soft and cloudy ethical
traction-a world of "ethics lite."
What would be wrong with such a world? What does our
world, charged as it is with obligation, have of the good that such
a world would lack?
2
1. The Consequentialist Account'

One answer to the question relies on the good and bad
effects of action. To justify the proposition "you have an obligation to feed your children," consider the good of nourished children. To justify the proposition "you have an obligation to give
to the poor," consider the needs of the poor. To justify the proposition, "the surgeon should complete the operation," consider
the needs of the patient.
"But," the consequentialist may be asked, "why obligation?
Why me? Why must I?" As to "why you" the consequentialist may
answer "because of your unique efficiency" (the surgeon is the
most efficient, especially during the surgery) or "because of your
special influence" (the surgeon can affect trust and loyalty generally) or "because no one' (no one should ever perform some acts,
such as rape, because of their invariably bad effects). As to "why
must you," the consequentialist may insist that all oughts are
musts, concluding that "it is always wrong for a man knowingly to
do anything other than what be believes to be most conducive to
Universal Happiness."13
12. This Article discusses consequentialism by referring to classic act-utilitarianism: the type that makes pleasure the key and that "holds that actions are
right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to
produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the
absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure . . . ." J.S.
MILL, UTILITARIANISM 55 (Roger Crisp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1861).

There are many varieties of pleasure-based and similar experience-based utilitarianism. Id. at 33-35; see also Martin Hollis & Robert Sugden, Rationality in
Action, 102 MIND 1, 5-7 (1993) (discussing preference-based utilitarianism); see
generally Amartya Sen, The Formulationof Rational Choice, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 385
(1994) (also discussing preference-based utilitarianism).
13. HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 492 (7th ed. 1907) ("[The]
distinction between Excellence and Strict Duty does not seem properly admissible in Utilitarianism .... For a Utilitarian must hold that it is always wrong for a
man knowingly to do anything other than what he believes to be most conducive to Universal Happiness."); see also Robert Merrihew Adams, Motive Utilitari-
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The Deontological Account

Another account locates the good of obligation in the
nature of the act rather than its consequences. To justify the proposition, "you have an obligation not to lie," point to the intrinsically objectionable nature of lying. To justify the proposition,
"you have an obligation to pay a debt or return another's lost
goods," point to the disordered nature of profiting at another's
expense. Here, this account is called the "deontological."' 4
Deontologist and consequentialist thinking afford some
strong grounds for supporting obligation, but can they be the
whole story? 5
3.

The Dispensability Criterion

If the consequentialist's ends would all be achieved without
it-and all the intrinsically good acts would be performed and
the intrinsically bad acts would be avoided-would we be as well
anism, 73J. OF PHIL. 467, 478 (1976) (noting the "triviality of... some of the
obligations that act utilitarianism would lay on us.").
The consequentialist can often explain promissory and contractual obligation in these ways. A promise often induces special reliance, placing the
promissor in a position where he is uniquely situated to perform the beneficial
act. The surgeon likely promised the patient. And breach of the promise is
liable to undermine the security of promises and the reliability of contracts.
14. See generally DEONTOLOGY (Stephen Darwall ed., 2003).
15. To approach this question, it helps to attend to the Aristotelean distinction between things that are good only instrumentally and those that are
good noninstrumentally as well-between acts that we choose for the sake of
something else and those that we choose for themselves. Aristotle concluded:
If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we desire for its
own sake (everything else being desired for the sake of this), and if we
do not choose everything for the sake of something else (for at that
rate the process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be
empty and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good.
ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORMs OF ARISTOTLE 1729
(11. 1094a18-22) (Jonathan Barnes ed., W.D. Ross et al. trans., 1984) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics]; see also ROBIN AYrTTELD, A THEORY OF VALUE
AND OBLIGATION

25 (1987):

Literally, what is of intrinsic value is what is of value in itself, rather
than of value instrumentally. If something is valued simply as a means
to a further state of affairs beyond itself, it is being regarded as of
instrumental value only. But not everything which is of value ... can
be so only instrumentally. Some things are of value in themselves and
for no reason beyond themselves .... And whenever this is so the state
of affairs in question will supply a reason for action which is independent of other desirable end-states or values, and which derives from
nothing but itself. Thus, intrinsically valuable states of affairs will be
ones which there are nonderivative reasons for fostering, desiring or
cherishing.
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off dispensing with obligation? Imagine a world in which there is
no consequentialist point to obligation. Imagine that in this
world, "Koloremundo," all the good consequences at which an
action might aim-beauty, health, pleasure, whatever-could be
as well served without obligation as with. Perhaps they have all
been perfectly achieved already, or perhaps the world is populated entirely by persons who on balance do just as much and just
as well and just as efficiently in the service of those goods without
obligation as with it. They are perfectly efficient and skillful in
all the arts and crafts from the moment each sets his hand to the
plow. So the training-related efficiencies of long-term commitment are not needed. They experience no temptation to serve
trivial or evil ends, so the stiffening effects of obligation are not
needed. The recipients of their services need make no accommodations to receive them and perfectly foresee the time and
manner in which services will be rendered, so the reliance-supporting effects of obligation are not needed.16 Imagine further
that there is no deontological point to obligation because no one
ever has the occasion or temptation to commit intrinsically bad
actions and everyone is given sufficient reason in pleasure alone
to commit the intrinsically good ones.
If you are an unmitigated consequentialist or deontologist
you find no reason for imposing, recognizing, or honoring obligation in Koloremundo. You see no point in burdening yourself
with strong duties. You might, of course, perform various good
actions. But you would proceed according to no firm order or
structure. You might accept some order, but only order held
weakly in place by suggestive norms rather than firm mandates
and which allowed that the action it recommended might just as
well be performed instead by someone else.
What sort of life would you lead? Perhaps that of the man
described in Plato's Republic.
[H]e .

.

. lives along day by day, gratifying the desire that

occurs to him, at one time drinking and listening to the
flute, at another downing water and reducing; now practicing gymnastic, and again idling and neglecting everything;
and sometimes spending his time as though he were occupied with philosophy. Often he engages in politics and,
jumping up, says and does whatever chances to come to
16. As an alternative, imagine a world in which as we went along with
projects we did them not better and better but worse and worse, and in which
those who received the benefits of our actions received them more readily and
effectively the first time, progressively worse on subsequent occasions. (The
impressionists may have believed something like this about art and beauty.)
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him; and if he ever admires any soldiers, he turns in that
direction; and if it's money-makers, in that one. And there
is neither order nor necessity in his life, but calling17this life
sweet, free, and blessed he follows it throughout.
He displays contempt for the "necessary":
[F] or the sake of a newly-found lady friend and unnecessary concubine such a man will strike his old friend and
necessary mother [and] for the sake of a newly-found and
unnecessary boy friend in the bloom of youth, he will strike
his elderly and necessary father .... 18
"Necessary," "anankaion," is used in a special sense here. It
does not refer to what you need to keep yourself alive such as
food and water, nor does it refer to what you must do to avoid
trouble. That man no longer finds his mother and father necessary for purposes like those. Rather, the term refers to a bond or
tie within a friendship or a family. The root of anankaion may be
"ankon," which means "arm." Therefore, perhaps the underlying
concept is that your "necessary" people are those who grip you by
the arm, obliging you to honor their wishes and to help them
when they are in distress.1 9 Another sense of anankaion makes it
refer to that which is morally compulsory.2 ° An excellent person
recognizes more things as morally binding than ordinary people
might do, but a debased person, it appears, will acknowledge
fewer.
The man described in the Republic is unsteady. He is inconstant. He turns abruptly from pursuing this pleasure to that, and
from engaging in one project to another. His soul is "tender"
17. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO 239-40 (11. 561c-d) (Alan Bloom, trans. &
ed., 2d ed. 1991).
18. Id. at 255 (11. 574b-c). This assertion is actually posited as a question
by Socrates, but it is clear in context that Socrates expects to receive an affirmative answer and that he approves of it once he receives it. Id.
19. Or perhaps it refers to those whom you have grasped or embraced.
See CELAS SPicQ, THEOLOGICAL LEXICON OF THE NEW TESTAMENT 97-100 (James
D. Ernst trans., Hendrickson Publishers 1994) (1978).
20. Cf DAVID WIGGINS, NEEDS, VALUES, TRUTH 26 (3d ed. 2002) ("Aristotle's contribution ... resides in his having signalled ... that need [necessity] is
a modal concept of a special kind and imports the linked ideas of a situation
and a non-negotiable (or in-the-circumstances-non-negotiable) good, which
together leave no alternative .... "). In another passage, close by in The Republic
to those quoted above, Socrates discusses necessary and unnecessary desires
and proposes two grounds on which a desire might be called "necessary": "those
we aren't able to turn aside [and] those whose satisfaction benefits us. The
desire for bread ... is presumably necessary on both counts, in that it is beneficial and in that it is capable of putting an end to life." THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO,
supra note 17, at 236-37 (11. 558d-559d).
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and abhors restraint. 9" Obligation-free man is "human being
lite."
Extend the thought experiment to social and political
things: imagine a family or a city in Koloremundo. Again, circumstances undermine the consequentialist and deontological
cases for obligation. The city has no enemies. The houses have
no mortgages. The citizens experience no temptation to lie. If
you are an unmitigated consequentialist or deontologist, you may
find little reason to support civil law or family rules or filial loyalty. If everyone thinks like you then the positive order will recognize none. This will make for a world strikingly different from
our own because nations and families here in the real world are
obligation-rich environments. What sort of political or social situation will emerge in Koloremundo? Probably one like that in
the "Beautiful City" described by Plato:
And isn't there license in it to do whatever one wants?
[And] where there's license, it's plain that each man would
organize his life in it privately just as it pleases him.
[T] he absence of any compulsion to rule in this city...
even if you are competent to rule, or again to be ruled if
you don't want to be, or to make war when the others are
making war, or to keep peace when the others are keeping
it, if you don't desire peace; and, if some law prevents you
from ruling or being a judge, the absence of any compulsion keeping you from ruling or being a judge anyhow, if
you long to do so-isn't such a way of passing the time
divinely sweet for the moment?
...

Isn't the gentleness toward some of the condemned exquisite? Or, in such a regime haven't you yet seen men who
have been sentenced to death or exile, nonetheless staying
and carrying on right in the middle of things; and as
though no one cared or saw, stalking the land like a hero?
[And this regime] spatters with mud those who are obedient, alleging that they are willing slaves of the rulers and
nothings.., while it praises and honors ... the rulers who
are like the ruled and the ruled who are like the rulers ....
[A] father ... habituates himself to be like his child and
fears his sons, and a son habituates himself to be like his
21.

THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO,

supra note 17, at 242 (11.563d-e).
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father and to have no shame before or fear of his parents
. . .and metic is on an equal level with townsman and
townsman with metic, and similarly with the foreigner.
[T] he teacher.., is frightened of the pupils and fawns
[..
on them, so the students make light of their teachers ....
[T] he old come down to the level of the young; imitating
the young, they are overflowing with facility and charm,
and that's so that they won't seem to be unpleasant or
despotic.
Then, summing up all of these things together.., do you
notice how tender they make the citizens' soul, so that if
someone proposes anything that smacks in any way of slavery, they are irritated and can't stand it? And they end up,
as you well know, by paying no attention to the laws, written or unwritten, in order that they may avoid having any
master at all.2 2
Plato characterizes it as a city of "license." Professor Arlene
Saxonhouse characterizes it as a city with "blurring of form" and
"forgetfulness of form."2 It is a Woodstock of a city.
There is something amiss here, some loss of gravitas, some
weakness of focus. If our own country descended into such a
condition it would not be the nation we belong to today but
instead a "United States lite." The same for your family or your
university. Something would be lacking: something unknown to
the consequentialist or the deontologist. And the same for each
individual. A city of soft and cloudy ethics would be populated
by soft and cloudy citizens.
4.

The Parsimoniousness Criterion

Apply a criterion of parsimoniousness. If some amount of
obligation would suffice to "do the job" from a consequentialist
and deontological point of view, we would-if those theories tell
the whole story-see no point in further duties.
But in fact it seems that we do, in some important cases,
accept obligations and perform what they require more fulsomely than that criterion would recommend and that we honor
others who do the same. Recent studies establish that husbands
and wives often undertake more chores than what the parsimoni22. Id. at 235-42 (11.557b-563d).
23. Arlene W. Saxonhouse, Democracy, Equality, and Eide: A Radical View
from Book 8 of Plato's Republic, 92 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 273, 280 (1998).
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ousness criterion would suggest. 2' The "bigger," more epic
figures of history seem to be those who embrace obligations in a
fulsome way. Odysseus remained true to Penelope and she to
him. Abraham Lincoln returned the penny. Horton hatched
the egg.
5.

A Variant of the Dispensability and Parsimoniousness
Criteria

Another approach invites us to consider the lives led by
those who reject obligation.
Of course, if a poor man rejects the obligations of his job
consequentialist disaster ensues and if a man of evil inclination
rejects the obligation not to kill deontological offenses are sure
to follow. So consider instead the non-criminal wealthy person.
Perusing the biographies of the rich and famous discloses two
basic types. The first type, Andrew Carnegie is an example,
develops obligations and embraces duties beyond what circumstances require. 25 The second type lives a life of unusual disconnectedness. For example, J.P. Getty purchased one of Henry
VIII's former residences and lived there with several mistresses
26
simultaneously, as though monarch of a private kingdom. People seem to require obligation. Unless obligation is thrust upon
them, they invent it or they deteriorate.
A related approach looks to our attitudes and our feelings.
If consequentialism and deontology were the entire story we
might be expected to display a "parsimoniousness of the spirit"
and to take towards all obligations the same bored attitude we
take towards filling out the tax return or showing up at work on
time. In fact, however, there seem to be some demanding
responsibilities, especially of a familial, patriotic or religious
nature, which elicit enthusiasm and an outpouring of the spirit.
27
Thus the Psalms repeatedly refer to "delight" in the Law. Psalm
your commandments, for you have
119 states: "I run the way of 28
given me freedom of heart.
24.

For studies of work allocation within marriage, see SARAH FENSTER-

MAKER BERK, THE GENDER FACTORY: THE APPORTIONMENT OF WORK IN AMERICAN

HOUSEHOLDS 197-98 (1985); Suzanne M. Bianchi et al., Is Anyone Doing the
Housework? Trends in the Gender Division of HouseholdLabor, 79 SOCIAL FORCES 191

(2000).
25. See generallyANDREW CARNEGIE, AUTOBIOGRH'Y OF ANDREW
(John C. Van Dyke ed., 1920).
26. RUSSELL MIuJLR, THE HOUSE OF GErY 234 (1985).
27.

CARNEGIE

See, e.g., Psalms 119:35 (The NewJerusalem Bible) ("Guide me in the

way of your commandments, for my delight is there.").
28. Psalms 119:35 (The NewJerusalem Bible).
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A Personalist Quality

Finally, obligation seems to have a strong personalist element. It is integrated into our lives in a way that is responsive to
who we are and who we wish to become. As with a rope, so with
an obligation: it, so to speak, "pulls on you," and it may damage
you if you try to pull away. And it changes you much for the
better if you accept and fulfill it.29 To be obliged is a part of what
it means to be a person.
F.

The Basic Goods of Ethical Traction in General and
Obligation in Particular

What about an account which is neither entirely consequentialist nor deontologist? In ethics generally, such an approach
can be founded upon Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics"° and on theories impressively propounded in recent decades by Professors
John Finnis5 ' and Germain Grisez.3 2 Their accounts base ethics
on a set of goods such as justice, friendship, and knowledge. An
ethical precept makes sense when it proposes actions which participate in those goods. You do well to study and read; it is good
to be knowledgeable and wise, apart from any further use to
which you might apply your learning. Can something like that
be said about obligation?" What are the final, noninstrumental
goods involved in obligation? How is it a part of human
flourishing?
First take a step back and inquire about the good of ethical
traction of any sort. Suppose there were little or almost none.
Imagine a world with second-sector ethics of only the weakest
varieties, those located at the furthest end of the continuum
from obligation-a more extreme Koloremundo. Your children's hunger implies little for you and no more for anyone else;
just that feeding them would be nice; pretty good; not quite a
total waste of time. Suppose that murder is to be avoided, in
pretty much the same way as boring speech. Imagine a world of
soft second-sector ethics. It would almost be a world of entire
29. This is symbolized by the installation ceremonies for many offices,
which involve shedding one's garments and donning new ones. See Meyer
Fortes, Of Installation Ceremonies, Presidential Address (1967), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL

LAND, 1967,

INSTITUTE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRE-

at 5.

30. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 15.
31. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIs, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
32. See, e.g., GRISEZ, supra note 2.
33. See generally S. Aiyar, The Problem of Law's Authority: John Finnis and
Joseph Raz on Legal Obligation, 19 LAw & PHIL. 465 (2000) (discussing Professor
Finnis' approach to obligation).
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ethical neutrality. Not exactly though-things would still be
good and bad. Moreover, you could understand their goodness
and badness, but only in the remote way in which you might
understand metaphysics.
In such a world, action of any sort would have little point
and deliberation on action would serve little purpose. Perhaps
you would act seldom, and after only brief deliberation. Perhaps
you would live ad libetem, practicing random acts of kindness,
guided only by habit and the rhythms of the emotions. You
might cultivate goodness and beauty only in the same spontaneous way in which Wordsworthian breezes and showers cultivate
the daffodils.
What would be missing? What does that world lack that traction would import? Here, I propose several answers:
1. Self-Control; Self-Command
First, ethical traction constitutes a primary component of
self-control, self-command, and firmness of character. This kind
of good is persuasively located by Aristotle in the NicomacheanEthics at a fundamental layer of the virtuous character. It is not
enough just to do what is right. Fully good deeds are only those
which are performed "as a result of choice and for the sake of the
actions themselves." 4 Choice involves balanced and mature
assessment. Choice involves "consideration and deliberation"
and "arises out of deliberate opinion."35 Choice, consideration,
and deliberation can only arise from a self-governing, steady
character. To act justly and temperately, someone must be in a
certain condition: "in the first place he must have knowledge,
secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own
sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and
unchangeable character."3 6
Only the self-governing, steady person, steadily reflecting
choosing, "is at one mind with himself' when he acts
firmly
and
3
and so to speak puts his entire self behind each action. " Only
34.

ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 15, at 1807 (11.1144a19-20).

35. ARISTOTLE, Eudemian Ethics, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
1942 (Jonathan Barnes ed. & W.D. Ross et al. trans., 1984) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, Eudemian Ethics] (11. 1226b8-9).
36. ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 15, at 1745-46 (11.
1105a26-1105bl).
37. The wicked, on the other hand, are "at variance with themselves" and
"rent by faction." Id. at 1843-44 (11. 1166b6-7, 1166b19). See generally SUZANNE
STERN-GILLET, ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF FRIENDSHIP (1995) (discussing Aristotle's treatment of the concept of unity of self).

106

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18

the steady man acts "with an eye to [his] life in its entirety""8 and
so embeds his action in a "complete life." 9 Only the steady person can fully display and instantiate his virtuous character in all
its fullness across the years and consistently through various
projects and circumstances.4 °
Conformity to a norm and adherence to the pursuit of a
good, especially when some effort is involved because appetite
protests and the desires oppose, involve an exercise of the will
and the subordination of the spirit. Fail to achieve supremacy of
the will and you remain immature, inappropriately child-like,
even when fully grown. 4 Lacking this trait is the major reason
why, in Plato's city of license, the man he depicts there is "lite."
Of course, any action of more than the most transient
nature calls for some degree of self-control. But action
embraced because of the traction of a norm or the pursuit of a
good, rather than ad libitem, demands more than action casually
engaged in. It involves a firmer and more systematic discipline of
the impulses and appetites. And it deploys more "self"'-one's
reasoning, norm-respecting, good-appreciating side of the self
takes charge.
When the traction is strong-when obligation applies-the
man may achieve a yet stronger form of self-control which might
be called "self-command" and "self-possession." Ethics with a
mild traction may impose only a mild sway upon the desires and
appetites; obligation compels them to submit entirely. Obligation is a field for the instantiation of self-command.
Aquinas makes a similar point in his discussion of vows.
What is the good in taking a vow and carrying it out, over and
above the good of the action you promise to take? Why not just
do the good thing without the vow? Aquinas answers that vowing
38. A.W. Price, Aristotle's Ethical Holism, 89 MIND 338, 342 (1980).
39. See ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 15, at 1735, 1738 (11.
1098a18, 1100a5) (stating that a "complete life" is a condition of eudaimonia).
40. Cf Price, supra note 39, at 342 ("[It must take a lifetime to display
[firm and unchangeable character] fully.").
41. See ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 15, at 1855 (11.
1174al-6):
[N]o one would choose to live with the intellect of a child throughout
his life, however much he were to be pleased at the things that children are pleased at, nor to get enjoyment by doing some most disgraceful deed, though he were never to feel any pain in consequence.
And there are many things we should be keen about even if they
brought no pleasure, e.g. seeing, remembering, knowing, possessing
the excellences.
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42
He also mainadds a "necessity" which "strengthens the will."

tains that "[A] vow fixes the will on the good immovably and to
do anything of a will that is fixed on the good belongs to the
perfection of virtue ..

2.

Knowledge

Knowledge, wisdom, and the activities which constitute
them-thinking, reconsidering, developing one's understanding, extending it or correcting it-are good things in themselves,
above and beyond some profit to which they might be turned.
One develops these traits and engages in these activities, not only
for the consequentialist reasons for which you might seek a cart
at the grocery store or a train to the financial district, but
because they are a large part of what it is to flourish as a human
being.
Obligation is a component of ethical knowledge. Ethical
traction not only gets you to knowledge and knowing, but also
constitutes a part of what you have when you know, and what you
do when you exercise knowledge. This seems to be true in two
ways, one involving knowledge of an experiential type, and one
involving more abstract ideation.
3.

Experiential Knowledge

To pursue the meaning of experiential knowledge, take as
an analogy the good of culture. Why would it be "lite" not to
belong to one? It is not simply because you would find no
schools or libraries. Culture is one of those widespread attributes
of the human situation which a thoughtful person seeks to
understand and on which he will often reflect. And you cannot
really know it from the outside: the remote anthropologist can
know its components in one way, but a member of a culture,
bound by its traditions and shaping his life in conformity to what
q. 88 a. 6 ad 2,
42. See SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-II
at 1571 (Fathers of English Dominican Province trans., Benzinger Bros., Inc.
1947) (1265) ("According to the Philosopher, necessity of coercion, in so far as
it is opposed to the will, causes sorrow. But the necessity resulting from a vow,
in those who are well disposed, in so far as it strengthens the will, causes joy.").
Thomas uses the term "vows" to mean promises to God, but may imply a similar
point about promises generally. See JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL
AND LEGAL THEORY 198 n.68 (1998). Finnis states that in a promise, an inten-

tion is affirmed in the sense of "asserted," but also in the sense of "made firm."
Id. Also note his use of the phrase "exercises of self-mastery to characterize
promissory obligations." Id. at 199.
43. AQUINAS, supra note 42, I-1I q. 88 a. 6c, at 1571. Aquinas continued,
"[According to the Philosopher, just as to sin with an obstinate mind aggravates the sin, and is called a sin against the Holy Ghost." Id.
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they demand, knows them in special ways. Only the member of a
culture can enjoy experiential knowledge of human culture, a
personal knowledge integrated into his experience of life.
The good, ethics, is a part of the basic human condition in
an even more fundamental way than is culture and is similarly
one important component of the proper study of a knowing person. It seems that we can understand good and bad and right
and wrong more comprehensively when they bear upon our own
lives. With the optic of men rather than gods, we see things most
clearly when we can take their sightings along our own roads.
We know things in a special way when we encounter them as
parts of our own necessary projects. We learn more about them,
and see a special dimension. As with culture, so with ethics: if it
had no bearing in shaping our lives we could never know it so
well as we do when we must write it on our doorposts and take it
into account at many important junctures.
You cannot thoroughly know a precept until you ponder the
demands which it imposes upon you. You cannot really understand a course of action without placing it in the context of a life;
and you cannot understand either an action or a life in the
abstract: each has its own quiddity, and indeed your life has a
special quiddity, knowable thoroughly only by you; you cannot
understand a precept fully until you have written it on your heart
and complied with its requirements. Those numerous passages
from the Psalms which lyrically commend the law and knowledge
of the law use a Hebrew word for knowledge-yada-which
refers not only to abstract but also to experiential knowledge. 44
Ethical traction is a component of full ethical knowledge because
it connects first-sector ethics to the lives we lead.4 5
But could you not make the same argument in favor of war,
pestilence, and famine? Those also are recurrent aspects of the
human condition, and Defoe, von Clausewitz, and many other
thinkers back to Homer have made them their study. Still, it
seems we could do without war but not without culture. Perhaps
this is because the good of war is outweighed by its evil. Perhaps,
44. SeeJOHN PAUL II, THE THEOLOGY OF THE BODY 99 (1997) ("'To know'
(jadac) in biblical language does not mean only a purely intellectual knowledge, but also concrete knowledge, such as the experience of suffering (cf. Is
533), of sin (Wis 3:13), of war and peace (Jgs 3:1; Is 59:8). From this experience moral judgment also springs: 'knowledge of good and evil' (Gn 2:9-17).")
[hereinafter THEOLOGY OF THE BODY].
45. Cf KAROL WoJrVA, THE ACTING PERSON 155 (Anna-Teresa
Tymieniecka ed. & Andrzej Potocki trans., D. Reidel Publishing 1979) (1969)
("[A] ction serves to approach and crystallize the experience of truth, good, and
beauty.") [hereinafter THE ATING PERSON].
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more basically, this is because the good that comes from war is
something that could just as well arise outside of war, so that
indeed the heroism of a man of war like Achilles is liable to be
outclassed by the heroism of a man of peace like Thomas More.
Culture is like peace not war. There is much permanent good in
a human culture which is not outweighed by any intrinsic evil
and which is not likely to be replicated by anything outside.
The same can be said of obligation. Biting hard on our lives,
obligation "gets our attention" and provokes a keen experience
and therefore vivid experiential knowledge. Binding our actions
firmly, it takes a lasting and prominent place in our deliberations. Focusing our projects unwaveringly on their proximate
ends, it provokes us to sustained reflection on the larger goods
which justify those ends. Certainly, some experiential knowledge
is attainable in Koloremundo. A man might visit the Trappists
46
He might
one week and train with the pit racers the next.
learn a bit from each experiment,just as an anthropologist could
amplify his knowledge of a culture if he lived among its people
for a time. But the full pallet of ethical knowledge cannot be
found in any form of ethical tourism.
4.

Abstract Knowledge

Obligation can also be a central component of a more rarifled intellection-the kind which involves abstracting from one's
experience of things the differences and attributes which really
count-making worthwhile distinctions and establishing sound
and coherent categorizations.
A fundamental aspect of the good of obligation is that it provides a ground for instantiating this kind of knowledge in respect
to the good and to the precepts of practical reason. The obligation-rich, traction-spectrumed world in which we live, in which
the goods bear in different fundamental respects upon our own
lives, provides a rich field for fundamental ideation of the good
and an array of things to ponder as to their import. Obligation
demands recognition of distinctions. To honor your obligation
is to discern and adhere to a fundamental distinction between
one sort of thing and all the others, between what counts for
much and what counts for little.
The absence of obligation is part of what makes the city
described in The Republic a place of "blurring of form" and "forgetfulness of form." The residents of Koloremundo experience
cloudiness of vision and thought for the same reason that they
suffer from weakness of will. They see fewer distinctions because
46.

But would there be Trappists or pit racers or only people dabbling?
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there are many important distinctions which they do not wish to
observe. As expressed by Plato in The Republic
He doesn't admit true speech or let it pass into the guardhouse, if someone says that there are some pleasures
belonging to fine and good desires and some belonging to
bad desires, and that the ones must be practiced and
honored and the others checked and enslaved. Rather, he
shakes his head at all this and says that all are alike and
must be honored on an equal basis.4 7
5.

Virtue: Disposition Towards the Good

Further, obligation is a field for the integration of virtue.
This is the case to some extent with any moral action. As Pope
John Paul II has stated:
Human acts . . .express and determine the goodness or
evil of the individual who performs them. They do not
produce a change merely in the state of affairs outside of
man but, to the extent that they are deliberate choices,
they give moral definition to the very person who performs
48
them, determining his profound spiritual traits.
It seems that a fully human act, aimed at a good, disposes
the character towards the good, and, more specifically, towards
acting for that good again, and that it involves the character with
that good in other ways as well.4 9 Professor Germain Grisez uses
the term "integrate." "[I]n choosing to act ... ," he writes, "one
integrates the good ... into one's moral self ... "50
Action performed in acknowledgment of the obligatory, it
seems, involves a firmer instantiation of virtue. The man who
feeds a hungry person as a "random act of kindness" may develop
only a casual appreciation of the good of nourishment and
benevolence and develops the trait of aiming at those goods on a
sporadic basis only. The man who accepts an obligation to do so
47.
analogue
48.
674, 732
1996).
49.

See THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note 17, at 239. Obligation is an
of knowledge itself.
JOHN PAUL II, Veritas Splendor, in THE ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II
(J. Michael Miller ed. & Vatican Press trans., Our Sunday Visitor, Inc.
See Karol Wojtyla, The Person: Subject and Community, in PERSON

COMMUNIT: SELECTED ESSAYS

AND

219, 235 (Theresa Sandok trans., Peter Lang Pub-

lishing 1993) (1979) ("In fulfilling an action, I fulfill myself in it if the action is
'good,' which means in accord with my conscience (assuming, of
course, that
this is a good conscience, a true conscience). By acting in this way, I myself
become good ....").
50. GRisEz, supra note 2, at 235.
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develops, it seems, a firm appreciation, a fixed willingness to contribute, and a deeper integration of virtue.
6.

Knowledge of the Self-Possessing, Good-Oriented Self

A fifth set of points puts the first four in combination.
Knowing that ethics asks much of us and possessing ourselves in
the effort to comply with its demands, we can know ourselves as
ethical choosers, undertakers of obligation, ethical actors, commanders of the self, and fulfillers of obligation. We can see and
experientially know the good and bad of our ethical choosing
and acting. We can discern and abstractly know our own making
of distinctions among our choices and commitments. We can
know the good which we have chosen in a new context-not only
outside ourselves but also inside-embedded in our dispositions
to action. When you accept obligation you become, as Scripture
puts it, "witnesses to yourselves.""1
Obligation enters into many passages of the thoughtfully
lived life: examination of conscience, regret, repentance, selfreorientation, renewal, reform, and, in the end, justified retrospection. These activities involve the consideration and reassessment of our duties and our modes of compliance. Knowledge of
self is constituted, in significant part, by knowledge of obligation.
Reflection upon ourselves is in important part comprised of
reflection upon our duties and upon how well or poorly we have
responded to them. So the Psalmist observes:
Oh, how I love thy Law!
It is my meditation all the day.
Thy commandment makes me wiser than my enemies,
for it is ever with me.
I have more understanding than all my2 teachers,
for thy testimonies are my meditation.
Professor Karol Wojtyla has referred to "the drama of good
and evil enacted on the inner stage of the human person by and
among his actions .. . [a drama in which] man has the experi51. Joshua 24:22 (The New Jerusalem Bible). Here is the fuller context:
Joshua then said to the people, "You will not be able to serve Yahweh,
since he is a holy God, he is a jealous God who will not tolerate either
your misdeeds or your sins." [The] people replied to Joshua, "No!
Yahweh is the one we mean to serve." Joshua then said to the people,
"You are witnesses to yourselves that you have chosen Yahweh, to serve
him." They replied, "Witnesses we are!"
Id. 24:19-23.
52. Psalms 119:97-99 (New Oxford Annotated Bible).
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ence of good and evil simply in himself .... "5 3 The obligationgoverned man is a protagonist in this drama and also an observer
of it.
G.

Real Obligations orJust "Commitments": Some Reflections on the
Relationship Between Second and Third-SectorEthics

What about the man who has no obligation but "commits" to
act? What about the possibility, in other words, that the good of
instantiating virtue in the character is really not a good of obligation but a good of choice or commitment alone?
Suppose a resident of Koloremundo were to mimic obligations by intending and acting as though he had some. He could
not participate fully in their good. It seems that the Koloremundian whose dispositions towards action are based on fiat can
never arrive at quite the condition of the man whose obligations
are based in major part outside of himself. He is never "up
against it" the way a person bound by real obligation can be. He
is "up against" himself rather than some external "it." He must
always know that the same fiat which he used to initiate the commitment could also be used to terminate it.
H.

What Obligations? Some Reflections on the Interaction Between
First and Second-Sector Ethics

A critic might assert that the accounts set forth above imply
a system of obligation detached from first-sector ethics, leading
to meaningless or silly duties, perhaps even duties to do bad
things. But this does not seem to be the case. First, consequentialism and deontological considerations, both directing attention to first-sector goods, count as well. Outside Koloremundo,
the thought experiment, they supplement the goods identified
above and shape obligation. Furthermore, self-control, steadfastness, and other second-sector goods identified in this Article not
only justify obligation, they also mold it. If you embraced a
"duty" to philander and desert, you would become less steadfast,
not more. You would be like a person tethered to a wild animal.
Your increment of knowledge would be trivial. After all, how
educational is yet another one-night stand? The drama enacted
on your inward stage would be a bedroom farce.
53. THE ACTING PERSON, supra note 45, at 49. The quote continues:
"[H]e thereby experiences himself as one who is either good or evil." Id.; see
also id. at 148-49 (discussing obligation).
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PART TWO: THE NATURE AND GOOD OF OFFICE;
HOW MARRIAGE FITS IN

I.

THE DEFINITION OF OFFICE5 4

Office has an affiliational orientation; a social and sometimes even a political character.
An office is often a role in a big organization, but that cannot supply the key. Not everyone in a big corporation holds
office. The tycoon who owns the whole outfit and whose 'job" is
just to crank it for profit, for example, does not seem to hold
office. Furthermore, not every corporate officer derives his role
entirely from the company. Lawyers and accountants are two
examples. Further still, not everyone outside an organization lacks
office. For example, a midwife seems to exercise an office, as
does a wet-nurse or a sole-practitioner doctor. Midwives and
matchmakers, tutors and nannies, executors and guardians hold
offices, just as innkeepers, shepherds, and haywards held offices
in medieval England. 5 Status in an organization cannot be
taken as the basic feature.
Status or position in society generally might be a key. For
example, the midwife and the lawyer and so on have a recognized place in many communities. Of course, so too has the
wealthy man from an old family and the famous novelist or political pundit. These positions do not seem to be offices.
Rather, the key can be found in purposes and ends. Office
is a specialized ministry. It is a position which has as its purpose

the serving of the good of others, and which aims at service not
in any way or all ways but in some specialized way. And office is
defined by reference to rules and principles which guide the
officeholder to that sort of end. Here is a definition: "An office is
a ministry to the good of others in some special respect, exercised under the guidance of a system of rules and principles
which impose obligations."
54. One cluster of meaning-not the one discussed in this Article-has
"office" refer to one or another specific duty-fulfilling action. Thus an encyclopedia definition reads: "a duty or service, particularly the special duty cast upon
a person by his position; also a ceremonial duty, as in the rites paid to the dead,
the 'last offices."' 16 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, INC., ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 712 (16th ed. 1952). This reflects an extension of meaning similar to that
for the words "duty" and "obligation" discussed earlier. These words can mean
the bond, but they can also mean that which one is bound to do. See supra note

2.
55.

See generally MoRIs BISHOP, THE MIDDLE AGES (1968).
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Ministry to the Good of Others

"Office" is social. A person who plays solitaire is not the
holder of an office. Office is social not just in the sense that it
involves social interaction, but in the more basic sense that the
officeholder aims at other people's good. A drug smuggler is not
the holder of an office, even if he is the agent of a club of drug
users, because although he is acting on behalf of others, he
serves them in a way that is bad for them rather than good.
Thus, your conclusions as to which roles involve office will
depend on your understanding of what is good, and a community's sense of office will change as its morality changes. In the
United States twenty years ago, few might have considered the
proprietor of a casino to hold office, but today many people
might think that he does hold one.
A litigant-plaintiff or defendant-is usually not the holder
of an office (although a representative of a plaintiff class in a
class action may be) because a litigant is usually out for his interests alone. So in a trial, the judge, the law clerk, and the stenographer all hold office, but the parties usually do not.
What about athletes in spectator sports? We do not consider
tennis player to be an office. Perhaps that is because the good
the player confers on others is, from the player's point of view, a
side effect. The player plays to win, not to please the crowd-just
as the plaintiff litigates to win, not to amuse the courtroom spectators. The spectators may be even better amused if he loses. 6
What about a doctor who isjust out for his fee? It seems that
he does hold and exercise office, although perhaps not in the
noblest way. His case is different from that of the tennis player
because he aims to promote the good of the patients, although
only in order to earn a fee. If he is a just person, he will not seek
to earn it in any other way. Curing patients is more than a side
effect.
Many officeholders exhibit a high degree of commitment to
of their ministries. Many physicans, United States
success
the
Marines, priests, ministers, and rabbis embrace a self-sacrifical
commitment to the good of those in their charge and regard
their compensation as of secondary importance. On the other
hand, many people of a less heroic stripe, such as corporate
officers and executors of estates, take no such attitude. Office, it
seems, invites but does not require an especially strong dedication to the good of the ministry.
56. Team players, a first-baseman or quarterback for example, do seem to
be holders of office since they are playing for their teammates' good, as well as
their own.
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Whether an outcome is the direct purpose of the action or
merely a side effect may be established from the structure of the
situation, as in the case in which the agent's compensation is contingent on his ministering successfully. But sometimes there is
no remuneration; sometimes whether something is a direct purpose depends on the intentions of the actor and, perhaps, on
what other people involved or society generally have come to
regard as normal. Guardianship of a minor may provide a good
example. Early in English history, the guardian was entitled to
the revenues of the ward's lands, and it is a fair guess that many
people took on guardianships mainly with profit as their motive
and did not make the comfort or education of the ward their
direct aim.57 Later in history, people came to believe that
decency required a gentleman to take proper care of his ward,
and guardians aimed at that directly. During the earlier period it
might not have been accurate to call guardianship an office, but
during the later period it would have been correct.
So the extent of office in a society depends on its moral system. A society of nihilists would recognize no offices. A society
of classical utilitarians might recognize few.
B.

In Some Special Respect

Philanthropist is not an office. To hold office is to exercise a
specialized function. That we all have duties to one another does
not make us all holders of office. Brother's keeper is not an
office. Social activist is not an office. Office generally involves
ministry to a special group or even a single person (the client,
the patient, the ward, the nursling), and it always involves aiming
at a special kind of good, not any or all sorts of benefit. Sometimes office involves ministry to all and sundry, but again, only in
a special way. The fireman may have obligations to everyone but
only in respect to conflagrations.
57. Survival of the ward might have been a direct (instrumental) aim, but
his comfort and education might have been conferred only owing to the happenstance of his living in the guardian's household.
58. A priest holds office. In the Catholic Church, it seems right to identify the ordained priest as the holder of an office (and of course Pope, Bishop,
and Deacon), but not the lay person-even though lay persons have a priestly
character of their own and are members of the "common priesthood"because the ordained clergy have many closely defined duties involving a ministry to others. See LIBRERIA EDITRICE VATICANA, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC
CHURCH
1546-47 (United States Catholic Conference, Inc. trans., 1994)
[hereinafter CATECHISM].
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Guided by a System of Rules and Principles

Artist is not an office.5 9 Nor is dancer nor companion, at
least not in our society. They might be offices in a society which
had formalized and ceremonialized those roles. Geisha in traditional Japan, for example, was an office.
The rules and principles are often laid down by the government or by some private entity such as a corporation, a club, or a
team. But they may be established by custom too. A matchmaker or a wet-nurse-a patron towards his clients in Republican
Rome or a Squire to his people in Jane Austen's England-was
what he was because of customary standards.
The rules and principles ought to be reasonably well
ordered to the good-reasonably consistent with one another,
stable, and appropriate to the ministry. After the storming of the
Bastille some effort was made by the revolutionaries to define a
role for Louis XVI, but it is doubtful that these efforts ever established a true office. Opinion shifted day to day as to what, if
anything, such a position entailed.6"
Might the rules and principles which define office be
founded in non-positive, "natural" morality? It seems that they
might. If you observed, for example, that some of the rules and
principles which define effective medical care are implicit in the
nature of health and disease and the availability of medications,
you might infer some rules of practice for the health care profession-"wash your hands before surgery," for example. If you
inferred a lot of rules like that, you might decide that "physician"
is a non-positive or natural office-one which might exist even
where there was no government or settled social order. The
same might be said of the offices of midwife, the wet-nurse, the
guardian, and the matchmaker.
The rules and principles which define office might be partly
positive and partly natural, as in the case of a physician or a nurse
where there is a government or a social order which regulates
those roles. The requirement of systemic consistency and good
order would then have to be applied with both sorts of norms in
mind.
59. To be sure, artists are subject to laws and precepts of positive morality
as regards their activities in buying paint and selling their paintings. But they
act ad libitem when they paint, subject only to their inward promptings. How,
when, and in what style an artist paints is completely up to the artist. Merchant
and stock-market speculator also seem to not be offices for just this reason.
60. And if it was an office, did Louis XVI ever occupy it? It seems that to
enter into office requires acceptance of its rules and principles.
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This logic leads to the insight that a Nazi "doctor," for example, was not really the holder of the office of physician. In his
case, the requirement of consistency among rules and principles
would not have been satisfied because of the Nazi rules which
required him to neglect the health of some patients and perhaps
to attack the health of others. That would be true even if the
positive rules and principles of the regime were clear and not in
conflict with one another. They would nevertheless have been
severely dissonant with the natural rules and principles for a
physician.
D.

Obligation

Like obligation, office is firmly binding. Social host and
guest are not offices because the principles which define proper
conduct have only a weak ethical traction.
Lover is not an office, except perhaps among medieval followers of the rules of courtly love.
Office has a juristic quality. A society of radical romantics
would recognize no office. There were no offices at Woodstock.
II.

SOME FURTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF OFFICE

There are several other characteristics which often, but not
always, accompany office and enhance what makes office good.
A.

Perdurance; Stability

Office tends to persist across time, and it often maintains a
high degree of normative stability in the teeth of changes in circumstance and fluctuations in society's ideological moods.
Office is seldom a matter of one-off hits. Acting as a member of a
jury, or a member of a posse, or a special prosecutor may be a
unique episode in the life of an individual; but it replicates itself
and works according to the same rules for those who held the
same offices before and those who will hold them thereafter.
Office seldom operates according to one set of standards one
month, and another set the next. Office is seldom much-revised
and certainly is not reinvented by each holder in turn. Rather,
the rules and principles of office last and last, endure and perdure, in sickness and in health.
B.

Recurrence; Replication

Most offices can be held by several people all at the same
time (and by a series of people, one after another). Several
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judges occupy seats on the same court at the same time, and one
judge succeeds to the office of his predecessor. 6 '
C. Expertise
Office often requires a sizeable body of knowledge, learning,
or proficiency in a craft.
D.

Dedication; Preeminence of Mission; Priority of the Office's
Rules and Principles

Officeholders often place the fulfillment of their ministrythe success of their line of service--especially high on their scale
of values, set especially high standards as to quality, place the
effort to satisfy those standards ahead of personal comfort and
monetary reward, and persist until successful. You might not rescue the drowning man if the danger were great, but a good lifeguard would do so. You might comply with a businessman's
request for a quick, inexpensive job of plowing snow off his parking lot, but a good attorney would not agree to do a slapdash job
on a legal brief or bond indenture, even if he knew that he would
not be compensated in full for the time required to produce a
fine product.
A close corollary establishes that holders of different offices
may reach differing results regarding the level of priority to be
accorded the same project. In July and August of 1916, the polar
explorer Sir Ernest Shackleton regarded it as his obligation to
arrange the rescue of his starving men on Elephant Island in the
Antarctic, but the officials at the Admiralty, with a total war on
their hands in Europe, were reluctant to commit resources.6 2
Both attitudes were correct applications of the morality of their
respective offices.6 3
61. See Fortes, supra note 29, at 6 ("[E]very constituted office outlasts the
passage of its incumbents. Funeral ceremonies detach office from the deceased
holder; installation ceremonies fill it again.").
62. ROLAND HuN-rFORD, SHACKLETON 607-09 (1986).
63. This sort of moral prioritizing occurs in the context of professional
morality. See ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHIcS 2-3 (1980). Goldman discusses the "strongly differentiated" professional role, in which the professional is:
[P]ermitted or required to ignore or weigh less heavily what would
[Such a] profesotherwise be morally overriding considerations ....
sional must elevate certain values or goals, those central to his profession, such as health, or legal autonomy of clients, or profits, to the
status of overriding considerations in situations in which they might
not appear overriding from the viewpoint of normal moral
perception.
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E.

Alteration of Character

When Ashanti rulers were installed, ceremonial "drinking
and eating with the ancestors . . . imbue[d] [the new rulers] ...
with the mystical virtue . . . which enable[d] them to do their
chiefly work."6 4 When Saul was initiated as King of Israel, the
'
spirit of Yahweh "seized" him and he became "another man. "65
When a bishop is ordained, according to Catholic theology, a
66
And even apart from religious
special character is conferred.
the officeholder deeply.
change
may
office
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seems
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F.

Solidarity of Ministry

Although not always (a fireman may never meet the person
whose house caught on fire), office holding often involves affiliation with the beneficiaries of office. Doctor with patient, local
lawyer with local business proprietor, for example.
Sometimes they socialize and become personal friends, but
that is not the point. The point is, rather, that the officeholderbeneficiary connection sometimes is an affiliation, an analogue
of a friendship. Affiliations involve thinking and knowing
together; lawyer and client must know and judge jointly as to
many complex problems. Affiliation involves reciprocal bene-

fits-physician treats patient and patient compensates physician.
An officeholder and those to whom he ministers may develop
special bonds which reflect intense reciprocities, shared knowledge, and commitment to the good.
The bonds of ministry may acquire an important personal
character. They may draw the officeholder to take action himself
even when others could minister more effectively. Newly
returned from a near-fatal expedition:
Shackleton . . . could not rest . . . while Marshall and
Adams were still out on the Barrier. Shackleton had had
no proper sleep for fifty-five hours. There were several
men on board, rested and well fed, who could have led the
64. Fortes, supra note 29, at 19. Many cultures apply installation ceremonies "divesting a person of his lay, secular, 'profane' social identity . . . and
creating him over into the personality that is the proper, ritually pure vessel for
Id.
the office ....
65. 1 Samuel 10:6 (The New Jerusalem Bible); see also 1 Samuel 10:9 (The
New Jerusalem Bible) ("God changed his heart.").
66. CATECHISM, supra note 58, at 1558.
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relief party. Shackleton insisted, however, that it was his
67
duty as leader to go back himself.
G.

Solidarity Among Officeholders

Officeholders often develop a close affiliation with those
who hold the same office by joining with them in a guild, meeting and dining with them frequently, and establishing with them
a ranking and hierarchy as to prestige and perhaps for governance. Geishas in traditional Japan had such arrangements; hostesses in modem America do not. Officeholders often honor
those who held the office previously, sustain their practices, and
emulate their virtues. They enter into a sort of solidarity with
their predecessors.
H.

Solidarity Between Officeholders and a Wider Social Order:
A Public Face

One kind of office is created by the political order, as with
the President and judges. Another kind is created by private
groups like trusts and corporations. And a third kind takes its
rules and principles either from public opinion or by defining its
ministry-as for example a physician might during an epidemic-from an aspect of the public good. Even in instances in
which the ministry might seem to be a private office, it often
shows a public face. The rules and principles of office are often
publicly recognized and embraced, so that officeholders who live
by them are publicly honored and those who violate them suffer
a decline in public regard.
The culture of office often participates in the public culture.
Some officeholders wear special garments and bear special
honorifics (doctor, judge, colonel, and, in the terminology of an
earlier era, "goodwife"). They get invited to march in processions, and when they die their offices are mentioned on their
tombstones. In medieval times, people were often named by
office, or at least closely identified with it even in daily parlance-even in very ordinary offices occupied by very ordinary
people such as those in Piers Plowman who greet Glutton in a
tavern:
Cissy the seamstress was sitting on the bench, Wat the warren-keeper and his wife too, Tim the tinker and two of his
servants, Hick the hackneyman and Hugh the needleseller, Clarice of Cock's lane and the clerk of the church,
Sir Piers of Pridie and Parnel of Flanders, Dave the ditch67.

HUNTFORD, supra note

62, at 291.
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digger and a dozen68others .
drinks of good ale.
J.

.

. Gladly treated Glutton to

Clear Boundaries of Entry and Exit; Proprietary
Exclusivity of Function69

Lawyers think only lawyers ought to practice law. Medieval
shoemakers had a guild and thought you ought to go through
the normal entry procedures before setting yourself up in that
craft.
III.

MARRIAGE AND THE DEFINITION OF OFFICE

The conditions of husband and wife include the raw materials which define office and many of those elements which extend
it. To be spouses is to shoulder special ministries-each spouse
looks after the domestic well-being of the other, and both are
responsible for raising the children. Rules and principles help
and are a recurrent feature of the well-ordered household, as
well as a universal aspect of the social systems surrounding marriage.7" Obligation makes sense, as the relationship is founded
on oath and involves goods of high priority. James Q. Wilson
tells us that:
In every community and for as far back in time as we can
probe, the family exists, and children are expected, without exception, to be raised in one. By a family I mean a
lasting, socially enforced obligation between a man and a
sexual congress and the supervision
woman that7authorizes
1
of children.
Perdurance and a high degree of commitment to ministry are
readily to be found in marriage.
The social features and solidarities of office are notably present within marriage. Solidarity of ministry could hardly be more
strongly expressed than in the marriage rite ("love, honor, and
cherish"); marriage involves a distinctive reciprocal character
68. WILLIAM LANGLAND, WILL'S VISION OF PIERS PLOWMAN 49 (E. Talbot
Donaldson, trans., Elizabeth D. Kirk &Judith H. Anderson eds., W.W. Norton &
Co. 1990) (1550).
69. See, e.g., ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 18 (1980) (defining "profession" as involving "the application of
a specialized body of knowledge in the service of important interests of a
clientele.").
70. See JAMEs Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: How OUR CULTURE
HAS WEAKENED FAMILIES 30 (2002) (arguing that society embeds marriage in an
elaborate set of rules designed to protect the fragile parts of marriage from the
interests of a wandering male).
71. Id. at 24 (footnote omitted).
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where each spouse ministers to the other. Solidarity of office is
readily to be found since, after all, many people are husbands,
many people are wives, many people raise children, and most
people descend from a line of ancestors who occupied those
positions as well. Those who marry join a culture which runs
back past the Wife of Bath to Penelope and Odysseus. Social solidarities are common since in many cases and in many cultures to
become a spouse is to assume other social roles as well: son-inlaw, daughter-in-law, sister-in-law, sometimes family business partner, and even member of a political alliance.7 2
The public side of marriage should be obvious as well. That
is why marriage confers, or did confer in our culture until very
recently, a special honorific ("Mrs.") and why it is commonly recognized in political thought and in religious authorities as a
foundation of the civil order. 73 To raise children is to form the
next generation of citizens.
Different societies and religious traditions have emphasized
different aspects of marriage, but these solidarities recur. John
Witte Jr. identifies a "core insight of the Western tradition":
[M]arriage is good not only for the couple and their children, but also for the broader civic communities of which
they are a part. The ancient Greeks and Roman Stoics
called marriage variously the foundation of republic and
the private font of public virtue. The church fathers called
marital and familial love 'the seedbed of the city,' 'the
force that welds society together.' Catholics called the family 'a domestic church,' 'a kind of school of deeper humanity.' Protestants called the household a 'little church,' a
'little state,' a 'little seminary,' a 'little commonwealth.'
American jurists and theologians taught that marriage is
both private and public, individual and social, temporal

72. Id. at 30, 40 (describing the embedding of marriage in a "universal
feature of all human societies, the kinship system" and noting that "[u]ntil
recently ... [a] family was a political, economic, and educational unit .... It
participated in deciding who would rule the community..
").

73. See, e.g., THE SECOND COUNCIL OF THE VATICAN, GAUDIUM ET SPES [PAsTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD] (1965), reprinted
in VATICAN COUNCIL II: THE CONCILIAR AND POST CONCILIAR DOCUMENTS 956
(Austin Flannery ed., Roman Lennon et al. trans., 1975) ("The family is the
place where different generations come together and help one another to grow
wiser and harmonize the rights of individuals with other demands of social life;
as such it constitutes the basis of society.").
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and transcendent in74quality ... a pillar if not the foundation of civil society.
Most of the various models or paradigms of marriage-perhaps until recently all of them-have made it an office in one
way or another, differing only as to which forms of ministry were
emphasized and which of the social solidarities were the most
intimate.
On the other hand, other circumstances of husband and
wife make it possible to redirect marriage along lines which do
not reflect office. Lover, host, hostess, companion, and best
75
friend are not offices.
It seems, then, that couples, cultures, and societies enjoy
some degree of flexibility as to the matter. To the extent that
they emphasize the ministerial, obligation-bearing, norm-guided,
and social or public features of marriage, they make it more
office-like and to the extent that they downplay those aspects,
they make it less office-like. To the extent that they develop a
romantic, antinomian, wild and free understanding of intimacy
and love and place marriage on such a foundation, they make it
incompatible with the exercise of office.
As our own society emphasized the "companionate" side of
marriage more strongly during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, it made the affiliation less office-like. And as Roman
Catholic theology emphasized the intimate and personalist side
of marriage in modern times it seemed to some to endorse a
move away from emphasizing duties, obligations, and office. As
various romantic and psychological movements derogated discipline in favor of the wild, the free, the authentic, and the
they undermined the office-like aspects of
unrepressed,
76
marriage.
V.

THE

GOOD

OF OFFICE AND OF MARITAL OFFICE

Suppose there were no office. Picture a world in which
those who acted for the good of others did so outside of any specialized obligational ministry. Suppose, for example, that people
74. John Witte Jr., The Tradition of TraditionalMarriage,in MARRIAGE AND
SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE 47, 58 (Lynn D. Wardle et al. eds., 2003); see also,
WrrrE, SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT, supra note 8.
75. See generally DAVID MATZKO MCCARTHY, SEX AND LOVE IN THE HOME: A
THEOLOGY OF THE HOUSEHOLD (2001)

(criticizing the "personalist" account of

marriage, and also accounts of the household which would make it an instrument of reform for the general social and political order).
76. See BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE: RETHINKING
OUR COMMITMENTS TO MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 56-61 (1998).
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who acted with beneficence did so ad libitem or guided only by
the sort of ethics that might apply to the philanthropist or the
artist.
This world is not quite Koloremundo. People there are
bound by some obligations: not to lie, not to speed through
crowded pedestrian walkways. But their obligations are not
organized into bundles systemically directing them to specialized
service. There are no firemen, although people do put out fires.
There are no tutors or guardians, although one person or
another steps forward from time to time to help bring up the
local children. Political leadership is episodic. Households are
fragile and transient. Sex is uncommitted. What would be
deficient?
A.

The Insufficiency of the Consequentialist and Deontological
Explanations of Office
Office resembles obligation in that consequentialist and
deontological analysis is helpful, but it cannot provide a complete account.
1. The Dispensability Criterion
As before, imagine out of the picture any circumstance
which supports a consequentialist or a deontological account.
Suppose again that people are born with all the skills, recipients
of services have all the foresight-get the consequentialist and
the deontologist out of the argument. Everyone is a fine fireman
without holding that office. Anyone could be the sheriff. A village could raise the children.
Still, a planet without offices seems to be a fragment of a
world. Little girls there do not become Brownies. Little boys
cannot hope to grow up to be policemen. In this world's version
of "High Noon" Gary Cooper does not wear the badge and the
cowardly judge is just a cowardly anybody. The world lacks stability of service. Tasks that are here continuously committed to one
or a few persons there can be shifted from one person to another
as readily as binder clips on a business report or horses for a race.
Political leadership floats about like the leadership of a therapy
group. Such a world displays more than a trace of Koloremundian liteness.7 7 It is not quite Woodstock, but it may be Disney
World.
77. Though Plato tells us almost nothing about the institutional structure
of the formless democracy, he does have Socrates say at one point that "for the
most part, the offices in it are given by lot." THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO, supra note
17, at 235. It is hard to see how such a city could have much of an institutional
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And of course in this world there is no maritaloffice; no specialized system of rules and principles applicable to husband and
wife. Neither spouse is bound by a system of obligations requiring ministry to the other or to the children. People may live
together in long-term relationships but are not bound to maintain them or to shape them along one set of lines rather than
another. They are bound not to assault one another and not to
lie or cheat. But either partner can move out at any time or withdraw his love.78 Actually, in the real world, shacking up is usually

just like that.

is
Like the world without obligation, the world without office
"lite. 79
soft, occasionally licentious, cloudy, unsatisfying, and
2.

The Parsimoniousness Criterion

Here in the real world, it seems that we make more of office
than can be explained by its obvious consequentialist advantages
and deontological merits. We develop office, exercise it, and
rejoice in it in ways that go beyond what it takes to "do the job."
We make someone Editor Emeritus not primarily in order to get
his input into the editing process and we elect someone Homecoming Queen for reasons unrelated to the functioning of the
student government.
We often expect the duties of office to be fulfilled with an
unswerving dedication which exceeds what would make sense to
a consequentialist, and we honor those who make sacrifices in
the attempt. Even the Postal Service, quoting Herodotus, proclaims on the facade of its main Manhattan building: "Neither
snow, nor rain, nor heat, nor gloom of night stays these couriers
from the swift completion of their appointed rounds." In marriage, similarly, couples often seem to make much of their duties
and extend them beyond their utility. Some cultures have even
structure or any sort of offices. How could there be the judges Plato refers to,
and what sort of soldiers in what sort of army would there be for the cloudy
citizen to aspire (transiently) to emulate? Perhaps the judges and soldiers are
all soft, cloudy, and transient as well, so that what this cloudy man hankers to
join is but a dissolving afterimage of the judiciary and military of the
superceded constitutional order.
78. See LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE:
WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY

37-38 (2000) (describing the "cohabitation deal" and its lack of commitment).
79. See JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITv OF FREEDOM 310-13 (1986) (arguing
that there is value in "social forms," such as those in law and medicine and

marriage).

126

NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18

honored the extension of marital chastity beyond the death of
the other spouse."0
What are the goods of office, then, beyond those familiar to
the consequentialist and the deontologist? What are the goods
of marital office?
B.

The Basic Goods

Office participates in the goods of obligation. And, since
office involves affiliation-ministry, solidarity with other officeholders, a culture, and a public face-office also participates in
some of the goods involved in close associations."1
1. Self-Command; Self-Possession
Obligation instantiates self-command; office does so more
deeply because its obligations are numerous, systematic, and
ministerial, and because often they perdure across much of a lifetime and require self-sacrifice.
Office involves a wide range of the self in the self-possession.
Especially when the office is perdurant, committed, well understood, and accorded moral priority, to conform to the requirements of office is to act under the guidance of one's deliberative
nature. It is to apply rules and principles which one has
embraced and made one's own.
The offices of husband and wife involve this good in a special way. Durkheim notes:
[B]y forcing a man to attach himself forever to the same
woman [marriage] assigns a strictly definite object to the

need for love, and closes the horizon. This determination
is what forms the state of moral equilibrium from which
the husband benefits. Being unable to seek other satisfactions than those permitted, without transgressing his duty,
he restricts his desires to them. The salutary discipline to
80. SUsAN TREGGIARE, ROMAN MARRIAGE: Iusti Coniuges from the Time of
Cicero to the Time of Ulpian, 233-34, 501-02 (1991) (noting that for a widow
to remarry was socially acceptable and even sometimes encouraged, but for her
to refrain from remarriage was commended in literature and bestowed upon
her the special right, not held by those who remarried, to sacrifice to the goddess Pudicitia).
81. According to Aristotle, friendship-not only close intimate friendships but affiliations and associations of many sorts-involves the goods of
knowledge and benevolence. See generally A.W. PRICE, LovE AND FRIENDSHIP IN
PLATO AND ARISTOTLE
OF FRIENDSHIP
METAP-YSiCS

(1989);

SUZANNE STERN-GILLET, ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY

(1995);John M. Cooper, Aristotle on the Forms of Friendship,30 REv.
619 (1977); David Konstan, Altruism, 130 TRANSACTIONS AM.

PHILOLOGICAL ASS'N

1 (2000).
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which he is subjected makes it his duty to find his happiness in his lot, and by so doing supplies him with the
means. Besides, if his passion is forbidden to stray, its fixed
object is forbidden to fail him; the obligation is reciprocal.
Though his enjoyment is restricted, it 8is2 assured and this
certainty forms his mental foundation.
Recent studies support this "moral equilibrium" thesis,
establishing that married people are steadier employees: less
likely to miss work, less likely to show up hung-over or exhausted,
more productive, and less likely to quit.8 3 Married persons are
steadier in many other ways as well: less likely to overindulge in
alcohol, drive too fast, take drugs, smoke, or get into fights.8 4
Professors Linda Waite and Maggie Gallagher attribute some of
these benefits to the obligatory bond: "husbands and wives know
their partners' well-being depends on them."8
Although it seems for some unknown reason to be a perennial source of amusement, the fact is that control and governance are part of the story of the good of marriage, including
control of the husband by the wife. A recent study finds that a
husband's refusal to accept his wife's influence is a key predictor
of divorce.8 6 There is a lot of wisdom along these lines in the tale
of the Wife of Bath, whose moral is that what women desire most
is sovereignty over their husbands. The Tale concludes with the
following petition:
[M]ay ChristJesus send
Us husbands meek and young and fresh in bed,
And grace to overbid them when we wed.
And-Jesu hear my prayer!-cut short the lives
7
Of those who won't be governed by their wives .. .!
82.
MILE DURKHEIM, SUICIDE: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGY 270-71 (John A.
Spaulding & George Simpson trans., 1951). Durkheim continues: "The lot of
the unmarried man is different. As he has the right to form attachment wherever inclination leads him, he aspires to everything and is satisfied with nothing
....When one is no longer checked, one becomes unable to check one's self."
Id. at 271.
83. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 97-109; Margaret F. Brinig,
Unmarried Partners and the Legacy of Marvin v. Marvin, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1311, 1316-17 (2001).
84. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 47-64.
85. Id. at 62.
86. John M. Gottman, et al., PredictingMarital Happiness and Stabilityfrom
Newlywed Interactions, 60J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1, 5 (1998).
87. GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTURBURY TALES 310 (Nevill Coghill
trans., Penguin, 5th ed. 1977). The stated moral is "A woman wants the selfsame sovereignty/Over her husband as over her lover,/And master him, he
must not be above her." Id. at 304.
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Knowledge

Like other affiliational modalities, office involves knowledge
in a special way.s s Only through being a physician can you fully
know what it is to be responsible for a patient, to treat disease,
and to heal. Only through being a husband or a wife can you
fully understand what it is to be a spouse, to be responsible for
another spouse, and to be a part of a married couple raising a
child. Marriage involves, as one of the documents of the Second
Vatican Council puts it, "an affectionate sharing of thought and
common deliberation."" These aspects of knowledge within
close affiliations help explain and support the numerous findings
in recent studies9 °emphasizing the importance of self-revelation
within marriage.
Through exercising office you grasp what it means to isolate
out a social role, to discern what rules define it and what ministry
justifies it, and to participate in a social order composed of a set
of interlocking roles. Like obligation, office requires you to discern distinctions. Offices are the forms of a social order.
You cannot indulge in forgetfulness of distinctions when you
are engaged in the exercise of one of the more demanding forms
of office. There are no Koloremundians practicing medicine on
the surgical floors of the Massachusetts General Hospital. No
committed spouse loses sight of the boundaries or forgets what
"forsaking all others" means.
3.

Knowability

Everyone knows what a doctor is. Everyone knows the judge,
the miller, and the friar and what is involved, roughly, in being a
husband or a wife. Everyone knows, because the office shows a
public face. Even if you do not wear a special gown or hat, everyone knows a great deal about where you stand in the world and
88. Affiliation involves "mutual recogni[tion] as bearing goodwill and
wishing well to each other." See ARIsToTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 15, at
1826 (11. 1156a4-5). And full friends know each other's choices and think and
know together as a part of choosing together. Full friendship involves "reciprocal choice of the good and pleasant." ARISTOTLE, Eudemian Ethics, supra note 35,
at 1960 (11. 1237a31-32). And in order to choose together ("reciprocally") they
must, it seems, think and know together, since "[c] hoice arises out of deliberate
opinion." Id. at 1942 (11.
1226b8-9). Thus, as part of choosing, reciprocal reasoning, and judging, friendship involves "sharing in discussion and thought."
ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 15, at 1850 (11.1170b11-12).
89. THE SECOND COUNCIL OF THE VATICAN, GAUDIUM ET SPES supra note
73, para. 52.
90. See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., ALONE TOGETHER: LAw AND THE MEANING
OF MARRIAGE 22 (1999) (describing numerous studies).
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what is expected of you in life as soon as you are introduced as
"Doctor" or "Rabbi." Beneficiaries especially know. No one
appreciates health and knows disease and understands which is
which better than the man who has been sick and now has been
healed. Moreover, his knowledge of the subject and that of the
physician who healed him reinforce and double one another.
The patient and the member of the congregation know a great
deal about what is expected of their physician and their clergyman. The institution of office in this way is a component in the
knowledge-experiential and abstract-of the community.
Only office-office which perdures, office with a public face,
office with settled and known and knowable standards of conduct-makes possible the institutional forms that develop critical
knowledge and ensure its application. If medicine was practiced
episodically rather than through office, there would be no American Medical Association, no New EnglandJournal of Medicine, no
medical schools, and no learned books on the physician-patient
relationship. Critical knowledge involves apprehending the
good of a practice, discerning the principles of conduct which
serve it, and holding up the practice against the measure. The
spurts of beneficence towards the sick that pass for the practice
of medicine in Koloremundo would receive no such critique
because no one would have the stabilized knowledge necessary to
mount one.
4.

Knowledge "Doubled" Within Friendship

Before taking up office, consider friendship. Knowledge
which arises within friendship has a special character. It is
strengthened and "doubled." Your knowledge becomes in part
hers; you see the world as she does; and you know yourself as you
are known by her. As Aristotle states: "[t]o perceive a friend
must be in a way to perceive one's self and to know a friend to
know one's self."9
To understand this doubling, start with a fairly superficial
mental process: observation. When you take an action in the
presence of someone who is a friend, so that the friend can
observe you as you act, you can, in a sense, see what she sees.
This is because friends to some extent see the world through
each other's eyes. Your seeing what the friend sees enables you
to observe yourself "from the outside." You experience a doubling of observation.
This doubling goes beyond the experience of seeing exactly
the same scene twice: rather, you see something again from a
91.

ARIsroTLE,Nicomachean Ethics, supranote 15, at 1974 (11.
1245a36-36).
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second vantage point. You see yourself as the friend does. When
you act alone, you focus on the object of your action-your goal.
When you observe someone else act, you see more-you see the
goal and the pursuer; the act and the actor. When you act under
the observation of someone else, she sees the goal and observes
you pursuing it; the act and you, the actor. When the observer is
your friend, you see things from her external point of view as well
as your own internal one.
[When I pursue projects alone] my projects are . . .trans-

parent on to their objects, so that my focus is upon the
objects, not my pursuit of them; but joining in those
projects with a friend I become conscious of his pursuing
them, and so conscious in a new way of pursuing them
myself (for we are pursuing them together). I thus
become explicitly aware of myself not just abstractly as an
agent, but as an agent with a certain character, thereby
a bare self-consciousness but a real selfachieving not
92
knowledge.
This doubling process extends beyond observation to the
deeper projects of understanding and judging. None of us is a
perfect judge of his own actions. Even the most fair-minded can
observe and judge only within the framework of his own way of
looking at things. Someone else who takes the time and trouble
to contemplate your actions can understand and judge them
from the outside and from the standpoint of her special mentality. And when this other person is a friend of yours, you participate in this understanding and judging. Since you and a friend
think and judge together and, as Aristotle puts it, "share . . .
thought," you can understand yourself somewhat as she understands you, and judge about yourself as she might.9 3
92. PRICE, supra note 81, at 122.
[1]n perception we become transparent to what we are perceiving...
(something like seeing outside and seeing through a window). That is
one way of being aware of oneself, yet without achieving self-consciousness. It is for the latter that one's fellows are so valuable .... For as,
say, I see a friend looking into my eyes, his looking is to me not transparent (as it is to him) but opaque, so that I see him looking into my
eyes without thereby seeing them myself .... It is from him that I can
learn most easily to distinguish the perceiver from the perceived; I
then generalize to my own case. All this just carries one from consciousness of one's perceiving fellows to an abstract self-consciousness
qua perceiver.
Id. at 121-22.
93. Friendship involves "sharing in discussion and thought." ARISTOTLE,
1170b11-12); see also PRICE, supra
Nicomachean Ethics, supra note 15, at 1850 (11.
note 81, at 123-24.
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Knowledge Doubled Within Office

Doubling of knowledge can arise outside the confines of
personal friendship. It can occur in other important affiliations
as well. People who work together at a common craft-shoemakers, soldiers, and brother officers, for example-see their
achievements and also their shortcomings as they appear to their
fellows.
The genius of the institution of office is to instantiate this
special kind of knowledge between people who may never have
met. Examples include physician and physician; physician and
potential patient; patient and newly hired nurse; nurse and newly
hired physician. Because they know one another through office
they can understand and judge one another and-doublingsee, understand, and know themselves through office. The lawyer and the client may not know one another very well otherwise,
but each can see and assess what the other is thinking of his
performance.
6.

Knowledge Doubled Between Office and the Social Order

The genius of those many offices which show a public face is
to encourage the doubling of knowledge between the individual
officeholder and his social order. The public holds up a mirror
to the officeholder and enables him to see himself from the
outside in much the way one sees oneself through the eyes of a
personal friend. Cicero writes:
My election as quaestor meant for me that the office was
not only conferred upon me but committed and entrusted
to me. While I carried out my duties of quaestor in the
province of Sicily, I felt all men's eyes directed upon me
and me only; I fancied myself and my office staged in a
theatre where all the world was an audience .... 94
The public may have observed many officeholders' efforts to
exercise that same office. It may observe many others doing so
simultaneously. The mirror it holds up to each displays these
others as well.
As with friendship, with office more is involved than simple
observation. Understanding and judgment are doubled as well.
Observing the exercise of office on many occasions, the public
develops criteria, expectations, standards and tastes in the performance of holders of office-especially holders of governmental and public office-and communicates them in many ways to
94. 2 MARcus TULLIUS CICERO, The Second Speech Against Gaius Verres,
in THE VERRINE ORATIONS 507-09 (L.H.G. Greenwood trans., 1953) (1928).
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each officeholder. Thus, the president and the prime minister
need not be philosopher kings and develop their own political
theories. Critically assessing each holder's actions, the public displays to him its critical appraisal. The president and the prime
minister need not be their own biographers and critics. For
many office-holders, the greatest reward of effective service is
"honor," seeing a favorable reflection of themselves in the public
eye and receiving a favorable appraisal. Their greatest fear is
disgrace.
7.

Virtue: Disposition towards the Good within Office

To embrace office and act to fulfill its ministry instantiates
virtue. It integrates the goods to which the office is aimed into
the character of the officeholder.
Any moral action may to some extent integrate the good in
the character of the actor, and any morally obligatory action may
do so with special firmness and stability, as argued above. Action
in the exercise of office does so in a special way, it seems, since it
is "bundled" into a complex of activities aimed in a coordinated
way at the goods to which the office ministers. Office involves
and develops character, often to a fairly comprehensive extent.
8.

The Doubling of Self-Command, Virtue, and Knowledge in
the Office of Marriage
The goods of office interact and mutually reinforce,

nowhere more so than in marriage. Self-command and self-pos-

session are doubled within a close affiliation. The ropes run
both ways. I can steady myself from her steadfastness of character. She can instantiate and fulfill the good of the office of wife
by making calls on my office as her husband.9 5 John Donne compared a couple to the two arms of a draftsman's compass:
Thy firmness draws my circle just 96
and makes me end where I begun.
Knowledge can be doubled with special intensity within marriage. In his play The Jeweler's Shop, Karol Wojtyla (Pope John
Paul II) portrays an engaged couple encountering one another
as though by chance in a city street. Andrew says:
I met Teresa when she had just paused
in front of a large window...
I stopped by her quietly and unexpectedly 95. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 78, at 56-57.
96. John Donne, A Valediction ForbiddingMourning, quoted inJOHN
WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 35 (1996).
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and suddenly we were together
on both sides of the big transparent sheet
filled with glowing light.
And we saw our reflections together,
because behind the window display
is a great, immense mirror
• . . [W]e found ourselves all of a sudden
on both sides of the great mirror
here alive and real, there reflected .. .
Teresa observes:
[T]he window has turned into a mirror of our future;
it reflects its shape.
(I] already saw, as in a mirror,
myself, in a white wedding dress, kneeling with Andrew
98

A wide mirror displays not only the observer but also the
scene around her.9 9 Teresa and Andrew can see one another in
the mirror, and also the world around and behind them; and
each can see the world in it as it looks to the other. Andrew and
Teresa grow in awareness, each of how the other experiences the
world, and each comes to see things from the other's perspective.
Each grows to see how the other is conscious of herself.'0 0
Andrew can be conscious of how Teresa's consciousness of him is
structured. Andrew can become conscious of himself in the way
that she is conscious of him. Because he knows her well, he can
see how he looks to her.
Doubling of knowledge reinforces doubling of self-command. I can see better how to exercise self-command from seeing how she does it herself. I can judge whether I am walking a
steady line by observing how my peregrinations look to her. I
perform the difficult feat of self-command because I surely do
97. KAROL WOJ-IYLA, THEJEWELER'S SHOP (B. Taborski trans., Hutchinson
Pub. Group 1980), reprinted in THE COLLECTED PLAYS AND WRITINGS ON THEATER
278, 285 (1987) [hereinafter WOJTYLA, THE JEWELER'S SHOP].
98. Id. at 287, 288. These passages appear in the opposite order from
that set forth above.
99. The mirror is a recurrent metaphor in Wojtyla's writings. See, e.g.,
KAROL WoJ vIA, The Samaritan Woman Meditates, in EASTER VIGIL AND OTHER
POEMS 13 (J. Peterkiewicz trans., 1979) ("I - yes I - conscious then of my awakening as a man in a stream, aware of his image,/is suddenly raised from the
mirror and brought/to himself, holding his breath in amazement,/swaying
over his light.").
100. Andrew's consciousness of Teresa embeds even awareness of her suffering: "that discreet suffering [he calls it] which at the time I did not want to
know, and today am willing to regard as our common good." WoJraTA, THE
JEWELER'S SHOP, supra note 97, at 284.
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not wish to see weakness of character reflected in her eyes when
she observes me.
As it is with a president or a prime minister, so it is with a
husband or a wife. In order to be a good one, you should not
find it necessary to develop a philosophy of the social order or a
theory of the family. It should not be necessary to do so because
the social order already can know what marriage involves, communicate its wisdom on that subject to everyone in the society,
and facilitate the application of those lessons by supporting those
who apply them and those who expect their spouses to do the
same. 0 '
Two philosophers make this point about monogamy. Joseph
Raz writes: "Monogamy... cannot be practised by an individual.
It requires a culture which recognizes it, and which supports it
through the public's attitude and through its formal institutions."' 2 And Robert George comments: "[L]arge numbers of
people will.., fail to grasp the value of monogamy and the intelligible point of practicing it ...

unless they are assisted by a cul-

ture that supports, formally and informally, monogamous
marriage."103

A well ordered "social constitution" (one very different from
that in Koloremundo) promotes and distinguishes social forms
one from another, discourages the blurring of their boundaries,
identifies marriage as one of them, embodies a morality of marriage, and communicates it directly through social discourse and
indirectly through a culture of narratives, myths, and symbols. It
tells young men what to expect and what is expected of them
when they bring their bachelorhoods to a close. It also tells a
future wife what she can expect of her husband and what he may
expect of her.
You do not have to do social and political theory to get the
idea any more than Churchill or Roosevelt or MacArthur had to
do political constitutional theory. Professor George's passage
continues:
What is true of monogamy is equally true of the other
marks or aspects of a morally sound understanding of marriage. In other words, marriage is the type of good that
can be participated in, or fully participated in, only by people who properly understand it and choose it with a proper
understanding in mind; yet people's ability properly to
101.
102.
103.

See generally STEVEN L. NOCK,

MARRIAGE IN MEN'S LivEs 11-42 (1998).
RAz, supra note 79, at 162.
Robert P. George, Neutrality, Equality, and "Same-Sex Marriage," in

MARRIAGE AND SAME-SEX UNIONS: A DEBATE,

supra note 74, at 119, 128.
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understand it and then to choose it depends upon instituunderstandings that transcend individtions and cultural
10 4
choice.
ual
The young couple can see themselves reflected accurately in
the mirror of their social order. A social order has which a wise
"form" of marriage will make them wiser about themselves. During times of faltering it will hold them steady and during periods
of domestic peace it will deepen their love.

104.

Id.; see also RAZ, supra note 79, at 162.

